For firms to invest in R&D, it is essential that they capture value from the knowledge that they create. Firms earn supranormal returns only to the extent that they can exclude other firms from obtaining and using their proprietary knowledge. Ironically, we have little quantitative evidence regarding how firms protect knowledge aside from the patent system. But much knowledge is tacit, residing primarily in the minds of workers and leading firms to use employee non-compete agreements to prevent their leakage via interorganizational mobility. In a sample of public firms reporting R&D, we estimate the firm-level returns to non-competes using an apparently-inadvertent policy reversal in Michigan during the 1980s. We find that enforceable non-compete agreements boosted Tobin's q by 26-30% in the short run, a result that is robust to a number of alternative specifications and placebo tests. This advantage, however, appears to be fleeting, perhaps the result of a long-run decrease in human capital investment by employees and the unavailability of talent in the local labor market.
Introduction
For firms to invest in R&D, it is essential that they be able to capture value from the knowledge that they create. Firms may attempt to commercialize discoveries by licensing them to industry incumbents (Teece 1986) , though the intangible, non-rivalrous nature of information complicates the process of securing rents in the market (Arrow 1962; Romer 1990 ). Alternatively, firms may seek to avoid the problems of disclosure and opportunism (Stigler 1961; Williamson 1979) by exploiting knowledge internally, improving operational efficiency and creating differentiating products and services to compete directly with incumbents (Gans et al. 2002) . Using knowledge within the firm does not fully guard against expropriation, however: products can be reverse engineered; processes can be leaked; and key employees can be hired away, taking proprietary information with them (Liebeskind 1996) . Regardless of which commercialization path they pursue, firms earn supranormal returns only to the extent that they can exclude other firms from obtaining and using the knowledge that they generate.
Perhaps the most frequently studied measure for establishing appropriability over knowledge is patenting. Since Griliches (1981) , numerous scholars have established that patent protection contributes to the market value of firms (Cockburn & Griliches 1988; Schankerman 1998; Harhoff et al. 1999; Hall 2000; Bessen 2008 ). But patenting is not without its drawbacks.
To obtain a patent, applicants must publicly disclose proprietary information in a patent application in exchange for what is only a temporary monopoly over the invention. Competitors can also work around patents by reverse engineering and patents may in fact afford competitors a partial technological map. 1 Patent litigation can be costly, especially for small firms with limited resources to defend themselves (Lerner 1995) . Further, non-codifiable knowledge does not lend itself to patent protection; software patents, for example, have questionable value (Hall & MacGarvie 2010) and may offer minimal protection in fast-moving industries where the rate of technology evolution outstrips the speed of patent examination (Hall & Ziedonis 2001) .
Given the limitations and costs of protecting knowledge via patenting, firms may seek to guard inventions and other information, such as customer lists, strategic plans, and tacit knowledge residing in the heads of employees, through other "counterdiffusion" measures. One such measure is a non-disclosure agreement, in which employees covenant to keep secret any proprietary knowledge they have obtained during their employment. While such contracts lay claim to all information that an employee either generates or becomes aware of while working at the firm and banning its disclosure at any time, whether while under the firm's employ or thereafter, they are difficult to enforce given the legal challenge of documenting disclosure.
Alternatively, a firm may attempt to limit the potential damage from unauthorized disclosure by disaggregating tasks such that any one individual has only partial knowledge (Rajan & Zingales 2001) . Disaggregation, however, may compromise the operational efficiency of the firm and moreover does not prevent employees from leaving the firm with the proprietary knowledge to which they did have access. A more thorough counterdiffusion policy is to simply prevent exemployees from taking proprietary knowledge with them to subsequent jobs in firms where that knowledge could prove particularly advantageous. Indeed, courts have ruled that an ex-employee working for a competitor is at substantial risk of "inevitably disclosing" information from their prior job, even if attempting to honor a non-disclosure agreement (Whaley 1998). Accordingly, U.S. states have granted firms the right to restrict the post-employment opportunities of a firm's current workforce by means of employee non-compete agreements (hereafter, "noncompetes").
Non-competes are (sections of) employment contracts that place restraints on the behavior of workers for a set period of time after they leave the firm, usually 1-2 years. A non-compete either lists specific firms at which the ex-employee may not work or describes an industry within which the employee is not allowed to compete either by joining or starting another company. As such, non-competes restrict ex-employees from leaving to join competitors (Fallick et al. 2006) . Non-competes are generally easier to enforce than non-disclosure agreements because it is easier to verify that an ex-employee is working for a competitor than to establish that said worker has leaked proprietary information. Non-competes are widely used by firms in a variety of technical industries (Marx 2011) and appear in nearly 90% of venture capital contracts (Kaplan & Stromberg 2001) .
In stark contrast to the extensive literature on the market value of patent protection, we know very little regarding how counterdiffusion measures, including employee non-compete agreements, impact firm-level outcomes. This gap is particularly puzzling given that multiple surveys of appropriability mechanisms suggest that the ability to keep proprietary information private via secrecy is as important to R&D managers as patenting, if not more so (Levin et al. 1987; Cohen et al. 2000; Arundel 2001) . In the only known study of non-competes and firm value, Garmaise (2011) finds that increased non-compete enforcement drives down R&D spending per capita but does not influence either return on equity or the market-to-book ratio.
The only tangible benefit to firms in Garmaise's study is the ability to pay lower wages; if so, then it seems puzzling that most states in the U.S. sanction the use of non-compete agreements in light of the aforementioned costs to individuals as well as negative implications at the regional level. 3 In this study, we address these questions by leveraging an apparently-unexpected reversal of non-compete policy in Michigan during the 1980s. We find that Michigan firms reporting R&D, which were able to use non-competes following the policy reversal, enjoyed a initial boost in Tobin's q relative to firms in other states. This initial boost is robust to a variety of alternative specifications including changes in business-combination laws, and we fail to recreate the effect in a series of placebo regressions. Moreover, this effect is increasing in R&D spending but decreasing in the number of patents, suggesting that patenting and non-competes may act as substitutes. This initial boost in q does however attenuate over time, suggesting that firms' 3 Stuart and Sorenson (2003) find that the spawning rate of new biotech firms following liquidity events was attenuated in states that more strictly enforce non-compete agreements. Further evidence for the deleterious effect of non-competes on the entrepreneurial environment was found by Samila and Sorenson (2010) , who found that venture capital yielded fewer patents, jobs, and new establishments where non-competes were enforced. Beleznon and Schankerman (2011) show that non-competes act as a brake on the diffusion of university inventions. Marx, Singh, and Fleming (2011) provide evidence that non-compete enforcement leads to an exodus of skilled workers, who seek more favorable employment terms in regions that restrict the use of non-competes. immediate actions to capitalize on the ability to more closely hold proprietary information may eventually be offset by the actions of employees or actors in the external labor market.
Empirical Strategy
Establishing the impact of non-competes on firm value is nontrivial for several reasons. First, although considerable state-level variation exists, unobserved heterogeneity renders crosssectional estimates of dubious value. Second, while several states have made changes to their non-compete enforcement statutes, many of these involve slight modifications that may not substantially affect the behavior of either firms or their employees. For example, in 2008 Idaho granted judges greater latitude in establishing whether an employer had a "legitimate business interest" in enforcing the non-compete. While such a change in the law may affect the behavior of judges, it is unclear to what extent its reverberations would be felt outside the courtroom. In a field study of non-competes, Marx (2011) found that none of the ex-employees in his sample who took "career detours" in order to avoid infringing upon the non-compete were actually taken to court; rather, in believing that a non-compete was enforceable, they made worst-case assumptions about how a potential lawsuit would play out. Accordingly, for purposes of our identification strategy we want to make use of a policy change that involved not just a procedural modification of the law but a substantial reversal. We believe that Michigan offers such an opportunity.
Non-compete enforcement in Michigan had long been governed by Public Act No. 329 of 1905, Section 1: "All agreements and contracts by which any person, copartnership, or corporation agrees not to engage in any avocation, employment, pursuit, trade, profession or business, whether reasonable or unreasonable, partial or general, limited or unlimited, are hereby declared to be against public policy and illegal and void." 4 This Act prohibited the use of non-competes until 1985, when the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act (MARA) was passed. The stated purpose of MARA was to centralize and standardize existing doctrine regarding antitrust policy, including collusion and price-fixing (Bullard 1985) . Doing so involved both introducing a new body of law regarding antitrust (i.e., MARA itself) and repealing existing laws and acts that touched upon such issues. Among the statutes repealed was Public Act No. 329, which largely addressed antitrust issues including "maintain[ing] a monopoly of any trade" (Sections 2-4) and "combinations in restraint of trade" (Sections 5 and 6).
The available evidence suggests that Public Act No. 329 was repealed as part of MARA due to its antitrust implications, and not specifically because of a desire to change the law regarding employee non-compete agreements. More than twenty pages of legislative analysis by both House and Senate subcommittees in Michigan (Bullard 1985) discuss antitrust extensively as the motivation behind MARA but fail to mention "non-competes", "covenants not to compete", "restrictive covenants" in the deliberations leading up to the passage of the new statute-and the accompanying repeal of obsolete statutes. Thus it appears that the legislature did not realized it had repealed the ban on non-competes.
Further evidence for the inadvertent nature of Michigan's non-compete reversal is found during the period after MARA was enacted. Although we could not locate any discussion of Michigan's non-compete policy in law journals just prior to 1985, multiple articles appeared in the months following the reversal (Alterman 1985; Levine 1985; Sikkel & Rabaut 1985) , apparently as a result of practicing lawyers having reviewed the repealed statutes. These articles highlighted the new enforceability of non-competes in the state, news which may have spread among law firms, which would have then informed their clients in hopes of generating contractual or prosecutorial work (Bagley 2006) . These developments suggest that the legal community was not aware of the potential for the law to be reversed but learned of the change quickly thereafter.
Moreover, less than two years after the passage of MARA, the Michigan legislature amended MARA section 4(a), effective retroactively to the enactment of MARA. Importantly, the reasonableness doctrine did not reinstate the pre-MARA ban on non-compete agreements but merely provided some limitations regarding the scope and duration of non-competes, as is common in most states that permit their enforcement. This post-hoc, retroactive amendment suggests that the legislature later realized it had repealed the non-compete ban without fully considering its implications. Indeed, both House and Senate legislative analyses of the section 4(a) amendment to MARA state that a key motivation for the amendment was "to fill the statutory void" (Trim 1987).
Interviews with Michigan labor lawyers active at the time of MARA are supportive of an interpretation of the repeal as inadvertent. Robert Sikkel (2006) reported, "There wasn't an effort to repeal [the ban on] non-competes. We backed our way into it. The original prohibition was contained in an old statute that was revised for other issues. We were not even thinking about non-compete language. All of a sudden the lawyers saw no proscription of non-competes.
We got active and the legislature had to go back and clarify the law." His account was independently corroborated in a separate interview with Louis Rabaut (2006): "There was no buildup, discussion, or debate of which I was aware-it was really out of the blue. As I talked to others, this appeared to be a rather uniform reaction. I have never been able to identify any awareness-and I examined this at the time-that this was a conscious or intentional act. It was part of the antitrust reform and it may have been overlooked. I am unaware of anyone that lobbied for the change."
Alternative Explanations
Taken together, these pieces of evidence suggest that the MARA policy reversal was an unanticipated and exogenous event that provides the opportunity for a natural experiment as far as the change in non-compete enforcement policy is concerned. Yet certain aspects of the reform may suggest alternative explanations for the results we find. We note four principal competing hypotheses here and address each with separate analyses in the robustness section.
Anti-trust Reforms. First, our identification strategy assumes that aspects of MARA other than the reversal in the enforcement of non-compete agreements do not increase the valuation of firms in Michigan. We also note that MARA, although it unintentionally repealed the ban on non-competes, purposefully set in force antitrust reforms designed to reduce pricefixing and collusion. Said antitrust reform might have favored small firms at the expense of larger ones, but its overall effect on Tobin's q is unclear. We therefore perform several placebo analyses of anti-trust reforms in states other than Michigan that were similar to MARA and that occurred around the same time as MARA.
Automotive Industry. Second, given the concentration of automobile production in Michigan (see Singleton 1992 for an overview), one might wonder whether an effect in Michigan is primarily representative of the automotive industry. While we include industry fixed effects in our specification in order to estimate only within-industry variation, we also take the additional step of performing several robustness tests and subsample analyses to rule out the possibility that the effect is attributable solely to the automobile industry.
Midwest Effect. Third, we investigate whether the effect we identify in Michigan represents a larger "Midwest effect" that spuriously relates to MARA. To rule out this possibility, 
Data and Methods
The sample includes firm-level data from Compustat for 1977 through 1996, the 10 year window before and 10 year window after MARA. We selected all publically listed firms in Michigan and a set of control states, including Alaska, California, Connecticut, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Nevada, Oklahoma, Washington, and West Virginia, which did not enforce noncompetes before or after MARA (Stuart & Sorenson 2003) . We limited the sample to firms that reported R&D expenses, were headquartered in either Michigan or a control state, were publically listed prior to MARA, and were not in the agriculture, forestry, fishing, or financial industries, resulting in a preliminary sample of 6,164 records. State affiliation was based on the location of corporate headquarters (not the state of incorporation) and historical moves between states were corrected based on the "comphist" table of corporate moves in Compustat. Given that ratios take on extreme values when the scaling variable becomes too small or too large, we dropped the top and bottom 0.1% of observations for Tobin's q and the top 1.0% of observations for R&D Intensity, dropping 94 observations. Next, we stratified and matched the sample through Coarsened Exact (CEM) (Iacus et al. 2011) . Coarsened Exact Matching is a non-parametric algorithm used to improve the common support between treated and control observations and to reduce model dependence (see Azoulay et al. 2010 for a recent application). Coarsened Exact Matching segments the joint distribution of covariates into a limited number of strata, and then weights observations from each strata to match observations between the treatment and control groups. We matched on the basis of Assets, Beta, and Debt-to-Equity, measured on a pre-MARA basis in order to ensure that the matching criteria were not influenced by the policy reversal. Rather than assign arbitrary cutpoints, we relied on the automatic CEM implementation in Stata to determine the number and boundaries of each strata based on an objective function and Sturge's rule (Iacus et al. 2011 ).
The matched (but original and unchanged) observations were then retained and analyzed in the analysis described below. Our implementation of CEM dropped 2,613 observations from the sample, producing a sample size of 3,457 observations for the basic analysis.
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Because CEM matches most observations in Michigan and only matches similar observations in comparison states, CEM can produce a sample that is more representative of the types of firms in the treated state (Michigan). It is possible, therefore, for CEM to limit the generalizability of estimates made from this sample, although the matching procedure itself should increase the internal validity and causal interpretation of the estimates. To assess the generalizability of our sample, we calculated the relative distribution of public firms across SIC2 industry groupings and identified industries with a disproportionate representation in Michigan.
As might be expected, the automobile and transportation equipment industries stand out in the Michigan economy, although this is also true, to a lesser extent, for industries associated with the production of metal products, steel, glass, cement, rubber, plastics, wood and furniture. We undertook additional robustness checks (reported below) to ensure that our results are not disproportionately related to those industries.
Next, we merged firm-level observations for Patents (and patent citations) into the existing sample based on data from the NBER Patent Citations Data File (Hall et al. 2001; Hall et al. 2005) . Patents was assumed to be zero when a firm did not have a patenting record, and a dummy variable (Patenting Indicator) was created to control for firms with missing patent records. In models with covariate controls, an additional 429 observations were dropped due to missing data, producing a final sample size of 3,028 observations.
Dependent Variable
Consistent with prior research on the valuation of intangible assets (e.g., Hirschey 1982; Villalonga 2004; Hall et al. 2005) , the dependent variable in all of our models is Tobin's q.
Recent research suggests that computationally costly approaches to the calculation of Tobin's q (e.g., Lindenberg & Ross 1981; Lewellen & Badrinath 1997) may induce sample-selection bias due to data unavailability (DaDalt et al. 2003) . We therefore used a simple approximation of Tobin's q, defined as the market value of common stock + book value of total assets -book value of common equity, all divided by the book value total assets. 6 As an unreported robustness check, we also tested the Chung & Pruitt (1994) approximation of Tobin's q and found similar results. Prior research also suggests that intangible assets may have a multiplicative rather than additive effect on value due to fixed costs in developing intangible assets, and that therefore a semi-log functional form is strongly preferred over a linear functional form for our regression equation. We therefore take the natural logarithm of Tobin's q as our dependent variable.
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Explanatory Variables
The DD treatment group variable, Michigan, is an indicator for firms located in Michigan based on the historical location of the firm's corporate headquarters. Compustat's historical files provide information on firms' historical locations required for this variable. The DD 'after' variable, After, is an indicator that equals one for all years following 1986, and zero otherwise.
Following prior DD research, we then created an interaction variable Michigan * After and used this variable to identify the treatment effect of MARA.
Although MARA was enacted in 1985, which could suggest 1986 and later as the "treated" period for our analysis; we instead used 1987 and later as the treatment period. It was not until late 1985 that legal scholars first recognized the change in the enforcement of non-competes (as opposed to the general anti-trust provisions) in the legislation and published their findings in the Michigan Bar Journal (Levine 1985; Sikkel & Rabaut 1985) . We assume that it would have taken some time, perhaps several months, for information about the policy change to diffuse from the legal community to firms and R&D managers in particular. Moreover, unlike individual mobility decisions, which can be acted upon quickly by workers, organizational changes to take advantage of the newfound ability to protect trade secrets may have taken additional time to implement. For these reasons, we believe that 1987 is the first year in which changes made by 7 Logging the dependent variable also helps to control for heteroskedasticity in the residuals. firms in response to MARA would be fully reflected in Tobin's q and thus use it and later as the treatment period for the analysis.
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In addition to the main effect of MARA on Tobin's q, we explore two moderating factors:
R&D Intensity and Patents. To address concerns of endogeneity , we use the pre-MARA value for each moderator and hold it constant throughout the post-MARA period. 9 First, given that non-competes in theory serve to block the diffusion of trade secrets, we anticipate that the impact of enforceable non-competes on q should be increasing in the level of R&D. We measured R&D Intensity as the level of R&D expense divided by total sales (e.g., Cohen et al. 1987; Cohen & Levinthal 1989) , interacting it with the Michigan * After interaction and meancentering it at zero to simplify interpretation of the interaction effects. Second, we examined the extent to which the effectiveness of non-competes is moderated by other means of protecting intellectual property. Our variable here is the number of eventually-granted patent applications for a given year, though we have weaker priors as to the effect of the variable. On the one hand, one might theoretically expect non-compete agreements to most benefit firms that have not taken other steps to protect their intellectual property by patenting (as suggested by Samila & Sorenson 2011) . Moreover, the act of codifying knowledge in a patent may help to reduce the firm's dependency on a particular employee; firms that do not -or cannot, due to the tacit nature of that firm's knowledge -undertake codification may be at greater risk of harm if an employee departs and thus benefit more from non-competes. A strong substitution effect between non-compete and patent protection is yet to be established, however, 10 so the extent to which patenting moderates the effect of enforceable non-competes on firm value may not be large.
Control Variables
Finally, we added covariate controls into most of our models to adjust for potential differences in trends between the treated state (Michigan) and the group of comparison states. While trends over time in the group of comparison states serve as the basic control in a differences-indifferences specification, additional covariates help to control for specific regional differences. At the state level, we control for personal income and the change in state employment. At the firm level, we controlled for each firm's financial condition and other characteristics that might affect a firm's market valuation. We also added Business Combination Law as an indicator variable to control for the passage of a business combination law in each firm's state of incorporation. Table   1 presents summary statistics for the mean, standard deviation, and range of all variables for the final matched sample (n=3,028). All of the control variables are also summarized in Table 1 .
-----Insert Table 1 about here -----
Model Specification
The Michigan natural experiment lends itself to a difference-in-differences (DD) model specification. In our analysis, we assigned firms in Michigan to the treatment group in that firms in Michigan experienced the MARA policy change. The control group is composed of firms in 10 Marx et al. (2009) found that patenting rates in Michigan were largely unchanged after the MARA policy reversal.
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Nevada, Oklahoma, Washington, and West Virginia -states that placed substantial restrictions on the enforcement of non-competes both before and after MARA (Malsberger et al. 2002; Stuart & Sorenson 2003) .
Pre-Post Analysis. For our basic DD analysis (Tables 3 and 4) , we used ordinary least squares (OLS) and robust standard errors clustered by firm to estimate the following regression equation without covariate controls:
Ln(q i ) is the natural logarithm of Tobin's q for each i firm-year observation, I j is a vector of industry dummy variables at the SIC-4 level, T t is a vector of year dummy variables, and ε i is the error term. We included as series of annual indicators to control for aggregate changes in Tobin's q over time due to business cycles, market swings, and so forth; we included industry indicators to control for between-industry differences.
For the moderated DD analyses (Tables 5 -9 
Michigan i *Year t+q is a series of 20 separate indicator variables modeling the passage of time in the difference-in-differences effect of MARA omitting the reference year of 1986 where q=0; T t is a vector of Year i dummy variables (as specified before); all other variables are the same as specified earlier.
Finally, we used a statistical simulation technique to test whether the effect of MARA average.
-----Insert Table 2 about here -----
Moving to a regression framework, we first reconcile the univariate difference-in-differences results reported in Table 2 to a series of simple models that exclude any possibly endogenous factors. Limited to indicators for Michigan, the post-MARA period, and their interaction, these models are reported in Table 3 . The DD effect of 0.50 in Panel B - Table 2 is equivalent to the coefficient estimate of 0.4979 reported in Column 1 of Table 3 , the basic model with no year fixed effects, no industry fixed effects, no matching, and an un-logged value of Tobin's q as the dependent variable. Having thus reconciled the start of the regression analysis, we then switch to the natural logarithm of Tobin's q in Column 2 and thereafter to better control for the nonlinearity of intangible assets (Hirsch & Seaks 1993) and heteroskedasticity. Given a semi-log specification, we can now interpret coefficients in Column 2 (and subsequent models) as a percentage change in Tobin's q. In Column 3 we add industry fixed effects at the SIC-4 level; in Column 4 we add year indicators; and finally in Column 5 we restrict the sample to those comparison group, it is nevertheless reassuring to observe that the onset of MARA coincides with a general increase in the trend in Tobin's q in Michigan, a finding that is consistent with a less complicated understanding of the effect of MARA.
observations matched by CEM. Column 5 suggests that enforceable non-competes increased the market value of firms in Michigan after MARA by 16.53%, with statistical significance at the 1% level.
-----Insert Table 3 about here -----Before proceeding to analysis with the full set of covariates, we wish to address a key concern with our methodology: that the anti-trust nature of the MARA reform may have conflated with the imposition of enforceable non-competes in producing the estimates. As noted earlier, MARA intentionally set in force antitrust reforms designed to reduce price-fixing and collusion in addition to unintentionally repealing the ban on non-competes. While it would seem unlikely that tougher antitrust enforcement could raise the value of the large, publicly-traded firms that are the subject of this study, direct confirmation of this assumption is not possible using the Michigan experiment given the simultaneous introduction of enforceable non-compete agreements. We therefore perform two placebo tests of anti-trust reforms in states other than
Michigan, that were similar to MARA and that occurred around the same time as MARA, to provide evidence for the assumption. We again found an insignificant coefficient on Delaware * After, providing additional evidence that antitrust reforms in themselves should not have raised levels of Tobin's q during this period.
-----Insert Table 4 about here -----
We now move, in Table 5 , to an analysis using the full set of covariates described above in Table 1 . While the comparison group serves as the basic control mechanism for any number of unspecified covariates in a diff-in-diff specification, the inclusion of specific covariates may help to control for a departure from the equal trends assumption (Blundell & Costa-Dias 2000) .
Across Table 5 Table 4 , and so this model does not use CEM. 13 Ex ante, we included a broad range of covariates to control for potential differences in trends between Michigan and the comparison states that could also affect Tobin's q. Given that many of the control variables turned out to be insignificant, we
After effect of MARA increased the market value of firms in Michigan by 11.76%, with statistical significance at a 7% level.
-----Insert Table 5 about here -----Next, we test the moderating effect of R&D Intensity and Patents by adding three-way interactions for Michigan * After * R&D Intensity (Column 2) and Michigan * After * Patents (Column 3). We predicted earlier that the effect of MARA on Tobin's q should be increasing in R&D spending which is confirmed in Column 2. Regarding patenting, while we find statistically significant evidence in Column 3 that the impact of non-competes is decreasing in patenting, the economic significance appears quite small. In Column 4, we include all variables and interactions together and prefer this as our "Final Specification." In this model we find that the basic Michigan * After effect of MARA is significant at the 5% level and roughly equivalent to a 25.88% increase in Tobin's q (although we adjust that estimate slightly to 30.00% when predicting outcomes below). We interpret the moderating effects in terms of predicted outcomes in the following section, although we note here from the coefficient results of Column 5 that the moderating effect of R&D Intensity is significant at the 5% level and the moderating effect of Patents is highly significant at the 1% level.
Predicted Outcomes. In Table 6 we interpret our preferred Final Specification (Column MARA." Second, we predict the average difference-in-differences increase of Tobin's q in Michigan (moving from the pre-MARA average to the post-MARA average, netting out the counterfactual trend of comparison states) and report this value on the row labeled "DD Increase." We then express the DD Increase as a percentage change (i.e., divide the row labeled "DD Increase" by the row labeled "MI before MARA") and report the result as a percentage on the row labeled "% Change." The predicted results are therefore comparable to the semi-log results estimated in the paper.
-----Insert Table 6 about here -----Predictions in Table 6 are based on the Final Specification (Column 4 of that firms with greater production of knowledge should benefit even more than average from MARA, and that firms that patent should benefit somewhat less than average.
To illustrate these findings, Figure 2 
-----Insert Figure 2 about here -----
Robustness
To test the robustness of our results, we perform several different sensitivity analyses.
First, although we selected control states whose non-compete enforcement policy most closely resembled Michigan in the pre-MARA period, here we test different combinations of control states to confirm that our findings are not driven by that choice. We also perform placebo tests on neighboring Midwest states (where the enforcement level of non-competes did not change) to confirm that our findings are not associated with a spurious "Midwest effect." Second, we test alternative measures of our key variables and alternative specifications to our preferred model.
Finally, given that our experiment is situated in Michigan, we assess the influence of the automobile industry on our results.
-----Insert Table 7 about here -----
In Table 7 we check the robustness of the difference-in-differences comparison. The first column again reports our preferred Final Specification (Column 4 of and not to other regional developments shared by neighboring states.
-----Insert Table 8 about here -----
In Table 8 we assess the robustness of our measures, specification, and sample. Again, Column 1 repeats our preferred specification. Column 2 defines R&D Intensity as equal to R&D expenses divided by total assets (instead of sales), resulting in a main effect of MARA that is smaller in magnitude (dropping from 25.88% in our preferred specification to 16.43%) but similar in statistical significance, while the moderating effect of R&D weakens somewhat and the moderating effect of patenting remains similar. Column 3 replaces the Patents variable with a stock measure of patents calculated as the five-year accumulated stock of new patents depreciated by 15% per year; we find a similar main effect of MARA, a similar moderating effect of R&D, and a slightly weaker and smaller moderating effect of patenting. Column 4 replaces the Patents variable with a measure of patent citations and finds similar effects to our preferred specification. Column 5 drops both year fixed effects and industry fixed effects and finds generally similar results to our preferred specification. Column 6 defines a new indicator variable (Auto) for the automobile industry and then adds interactions between Michigan, After, and Auto (i.e., interactions for Michigan * Auto, After * Auto, and Michigan * After * Auto) to the Final Specification to estimate the DD effect of MARA for the automobile industry separately from our other effects (the main effect of Auto is co-linear with the SIC4 indicators and omitted from the analysis). Results for the additional interactions for Auto were all statistically insignificant, whereas results for all of the other effects were similar to results from our preferred
Final Specification (Column 4 of Table 5 ).
To test the sensitivity of our sample, in Column 7 of Table 8 we expand the sample to include firms that do not report R&D expenses in Compustat by assuming zero R&D expenses for missing data rather than dropping observations from the sample (the sample size increases from n=3,028 to n=9,208). This approach, while imputing a zero value for R&D expenses for most observations, allows us to test our predicted effects across a broader population. We find that the main effect of MARA and the moderating effect of Patents are similar to the better identified R&D population, although the moderating effect of R&D Intensity is no longer statistically significant, perhaps due to the added imprecision in the measurement of R&D.
Finally, in Column 8 we take the more extreme step of dropping all firms that are associated with industries that had a disproportionate influence in the Michigan economy, including automobiles, transportation equipment, metal products, steel, glass, cement, rubber, plastics, wood and furniture. Doing so drops 57% of the sample and, unsurprisingly, weakens the statistical significance of the results, although all coefficients retain their signs and are generally similar in magnitude.
In conclusion, we see little evidence in our robustness checks that our findings depend upon the specific comparison made in the difference-in-differences analysis (i.e., the composition of the comparison group). Furthermore, we see no evidence that effects in Michigan were part of a broader Midwest pattern. Results for the moderating variables (R&D Intensity and Patents)
were robust to alternative measures, and we found no indication that the generalizability of our findings are limited to dominant industries in Michigan.
Dynamics of Non-compete Enforcement and Firm Value
The evidence above reflects an average, before-to-after estimation of the effect of MARA on Tobin's q, using a standard difference-in-differences configuration. 
Conclusion
This article examines how non-patent methods of protecting proprietary information contribute to firm value. Specifically, we test the impact of enforceable employee non-compete agreements on Tobin's q for public firms that report their level of R&D investment using a difference-indifferences approach derived from an inadvertent reversal of non-compete policy in Michigan.
Michigan firms enjoyed a 25-30% boost in q following the imposition of non-compete enforceability compared with a matched set of firms in states that continued to restrict the use of non-competes, an effect that is increasing in R&D investment and (weakly) decreasing in patenting. The effects remain significant under alternative specifications including the control group and the sample itself; moreover, they are not obtained in a series of placebo regressions in states that are nearby or that adopted antitrust reforms.
Interestingly, the effect does not appear to be cumulative but rather has a strong initial onset following the reform and then attenuates over time. The apparently fleeting nature of the boost in firm value from non-competes should inform both executives and policymakers seeking to help firms build long-term advantage: although non-competes appear to be a win in the shortterm, their long-term effect on performance appears to be less attractive.
This article contributes to a fledgling literature on non-patent methods of protecting intellectual property and fills a gap in work on non-competes, which has focused on implications for individuals and regional productivity but less often on firms themselves. While our data does not permit us to fully specify the mechanisms underlying the observed patterns in firm value, we see this as an important next step toward a full welfare analysis. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) Table 2 . Univariate Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Tobin's q Table 2 reports the average difference in Tobin's q, both before and after MARA, and between Michigan and comparison states. The descriptive "difference-in-differences" (DD) effect appears in the lower-right cell and is equal to the difference of the other two differences. The DD effect of 0.50 corresponds to the coefficient estimate of 0.4979 reported in Model 1 (the basic DD model with no year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, or matching). The sample used here is broader than the sample reported in Table 1 Table 3 . Basic Effect of MARA on Tobin's q Table 3 analyzes of the basic effect of MARA on Tobin's q for a +/-10 year window before and after MARA. The sample is the same as the sample reported in Table 1 , except that it is not restricted by missing values and is therefore larger. Column 1 uses the unlogged value of Tobin's q as the dependent variable to reconcile the 10 year difference-in-differences effect reported in Table 2 (0.50) with the estimate for Michigan * After (0.4979) reported in Column 1. Column 2, and all models thereafter, use the natural log of Tobin's q as the dependent variable to control for heteroskedasticity and to better estimate the non-linear effects of intangible assets on market value. Column 3 includes indicator variables for each SIC-4 category to control between-industry variation. Column 4 includes indicator variables for each year to control between year variation, as well as industry indicators. Column 5 includes both industry and year fixed effects, and then uses coarsened exact matching (CEM) to stratify and match observations on the basis of Assets, Beta, and Debt-to-Equity to improve common support in the sample between firms in Michigan and firms in comparison states on the basis of firm size, risk, and capital structure. All models are estimated by OLS and cluster robust standard errors by firm (S.E. in parentheses). Fixed-effects indicators are estimated but not reported to conserve space. Two-tailed tests: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
(1) (2) (3) (4) percentiles of each variable so as to not assume normality in their distributions. Due to the skewed distribution in patenting, 48.8% of firms in our sample did not patent at all and so the prediction at the 25 th percentile of patents is for firms at Patents = 0. The row "MI before MARA" reports the predicted level of Tobin's q before MARA. The row "DD Increase" reports the before-to-after difference in the value of Tobin's q in Michigan after accounting for concurrent changes in comparison states. The row "% Change" reports the predicted DD increase as a percentage of the before period value (i.e. we divide the row labeled "DD Increase" by the row labeled "MI before MARA" and report the result as a percentage).
(1) (2) (3) (4) Column 3 defines Patents as a stock measure that is accumulated and depreciated over 5 prior years. Column 4 defines Patents as equal to the number of inbound patent citations. Column 5 drops year and industry fixed effects. Column 6 defines a new indicator variable (Auto) for the automobile industry and then adds interactions between Auto, Michigan and After to the Final Specification to separately estimate the DD effect of MARA for the automobile industry (the main effect for Auto is collinear with industry fixed effects and is therefore omitted from the analysis). Column 7 expands the sample to include firms that do not report R&D expense by assuming a value of zero for missing data on R&D expenses. Column 8 drops industries with a disproportionate presence in the Michigan economy, including automobiles, transportation equipment, metal products, steel, glass, cement, rubber, plastics, wood and furniture. All models are estimated by OLS, include year and industry fixed effects, use a CEM matched sample, and cluster robust standard errors by firm (S.E. in parentheses). Two-tailed tests: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) -1986 average is plotted as a dotted-blue line, the post-1986 average is plotted as a dashed-red line, and the post-1986 lineartrend is plotted as a downward-sloping red line. To test whether the basic effect of MARA attenuated over time (i.e., whether the slope of the solid red line differs from zero), we simulated 1,000 effect sizes from the YBY Model for the post-MARA period using the vector of coefficient estimates and the variance-covariance matrix estimated in the YBY Model, and then used the simulated data to regress the equation (EffectSize it = β0 + β 1 Year it + ε it ) using OLS with robust standard errors clustered by year, for the years 1986 through 1996 (p=.002).
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